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Approach to Socioeconomic Neutrality in
Political Participation:
Participation in America revisited

by

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Abstract

The first section of this paper replicates the analysis of the second part of Participation in America statistically. In general, the paper supports Verba and Nie's conclusion. The total socioeconomic biases in voting, campaign and communal activities measured in socioeconomic status elasticity of participation are 0.63, 0.72 and 0.77. The independent socioeconomic effects on voting, campaign and communal activities account for 75%, 82% and 81% of the above socioeconomic biases. Among different variables, organizational involvement and the Republican Party affiliation reinforced SES bias whereas the Democratic Party affiliation corrected the bias in all modes of political activities. Urbanism and black consciousness correct the bias in communal activity but the latter reinforced the bias in voting.

The second section explores an opportunity for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation by manipulation of organizational structure. It shows that a complete socioeconomic neutrality in voting, campaign and communal activities in the United States can be achieved through altering the present socioeconomic bias in organizational involvement of 0.27 to somewhat between -0.35 to -0.60. The analysis also shows that socioeconomic neutrality in participation can not be achieved through economic development.

Approach to Socioeconomic Neutrality in Political
Participation: Participation in America revisited

Introduction

Political Participation is a crucial element in democratic theory. Participation in America written in 1972 made a significant contribution to an understanding of participation in American political life. In that book, Verba and Nie answered empirical questions of what are the modes, causes and consequences of political participation in the United States. They also posed a normative question as well. They found that participation in America was not equal; the higher the socioeconomic status, the more they participate in politics. Since political leaders are responsive to those who participate (Verba and Nie, 1972), the bias in participation would have a significant effect on equality in socioeconomic domain. Although it was not explicit, Verba and Nie preferred more political equality to less political equality.

Political equality in Verba and Nie's terms can be restated as "Socio-economic Neutrality in Political Participation". It refers to the extent to which the socioeconomically disadvantaged citizens reveal their preferences in political system through various political acts within the limit of the constitutional allowance, while other conditions of democracy such as right to vote, organize and the freedom of speech are being held constant.

The main purpose of this paper is to explore opportunities for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in political participation in the United States. The paper is divided into two sections. The first section develops a statistical model to analyze the social and psychological structure of socioeconomic

neutrality in participation. By estimating the model, we replicate the analysis of the second part of Participation in America statistically. The second section uses the above model to develop necessary conditions for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulation of organizational structure. Here we ask: 1) what the necessary conditions are for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation; 2) whether or not United States' political system meets these necessary conditions; 3) which organizations, if any, in the United States best meet the necessary conditions. Finally, we ask whether or not socioeconomic neutrality in participation can be achieved through economic development.

We will pursue the above objectives by employing the data collected by the Cross-National Program in Political and Social Changes headed by Sidney Verba.

Structure of Socioeconomic Neutrality in Political Participation

Our first approach is to develop a statistical model to analyze the sociological structure of socioeconomic neutrality in the United States.

In the second part of Participation in America, Verba and Nie began their analysis with the standard socioeconomic status model of political participation: the higher the socioeconomic level, the greater citizen participation in politics. They then go on to ask what social and psychological variables would neutralize the socioeconomic status bias in political participation in the United States. Their approach to assess the magnitudes of the variables' neutralizing force involves the following four steps: 1) What is

the effect of a particular variable on the rate of political participation independent of socioeconomic status? 2) Is this impact higher for lower socioeconomic status citizens or higher for higher socioeconomic citizens? 3) What is the accessibility of this variable to lower socioeconomic status citizens? 4) What is the total effect of this variable on socioeconomic bias in political participation? They found that organizational involvement and party identification reinforced socioeconomic bias in participation, whereas black consciousness corrected the socioeconomic bias significantly.

Their approach can be easily seen in Figure 1 where we find two lines running in diagonally opposite directions. The rising line A shows the true

(Figure 1 about here)

socioeconomic effect on participation: the higher the socioeconomic status, the greater citizen participation in politics. The descending line B shows the effect of some variable, say X. The relationship between socioeconomic status and X is assumed to be positive, whereas the relationship between X and participation is negative. The combined effect of these two patterns of relationship makes the observed socioeconomic bias in participation as expressed by line C. In this case, X is acting as a socioeconomic neutralizing force. What Verba and Nie did was to measure the extent of deviation from C to A to assess the neutralizing effects of politically relevant variables.

Verba and Nie's approach can be expressed by simple statistical equations. The log-linear relationship between t's level of political participation (P_t) and socioeconomic status (E_t) can be shown as:

$$\ln P_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln E_t + u_{1t} \quad \text{--- (1)}$$

where α_0 , α_1 , and u_{1t} indicate a constant, socioeconomic neutrality coefficient and residuals, respectively. However, P_t is not only a function of E_t but also on the set of other social and psychological variables denoted by S_{jt} .

$$\ln P_t = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln E_t + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j \ln S_{jt} + u_{2t} \quad \text{--- (2)}$$

The socioeconomic neutrality coefficient (α_1) defined in equation 1 is related to the behavioral parameters defined in equation 2 by:

$$\alpha_1 = \beta_1 + \sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje} \quad \text{--- (3)}$$

where γ_{sje} is the elasticity of S_j with respect to E . By estimating β_1 , β_j and γ_{sje} individually, we are able to ascertain socio-psychological structure of socioeconomic neutrality in participation. It is obvious that β_1 is the same as the standard socioeconomic model of participation employed by Verba and Nie, and β_j , γ_{sje} and $\sum_{j=2}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje}$ were comparable to the first, third and the last steps of Verba and Nie described above.

So far, we have not defined social and psychological variables (S_{jt}). We hypothesize that organizational involvement, the place of residence, race consciousness, and party identification are related to our socioeconomic neutrality model. While sex is an important variable in influencing the rate of participation, it is not the function of socioeconomic status (SES).

Therefore, we include it in equation 2 but exclude it from equation 3.

Empirically, too, there is little relationship between SES and sex, in part because we use family income rather than individual income to construct the SES index. The simple correlation between sex and SES is -0.004 and it is not statistically significant at 0.05 level.

We use the same indices of voting, campaign and communal activities, and SES constructed by Verba and Nie (see Appendixes of Verba and Nie, 1972). Organizational involvement index is based on the scale assigning 1 for respondents who are not members of any organization, 2 for passive members and 3 for active members regardless of the number and kind of organization. The place of residence is measured as the size of population where the respondents live. Party identification is measured as the strength of party identification. We assign 1 for independents, 2 for weak identifiers, and 3 for strong identifiers in each party. There is a problem of measuring race consciousness since our data do not have this variable. We assume all blacks have some form of black consciousness to make our model operational. We assign 1 for blacks and 0 otherwise.

A structural model prefers a unit-free measurement. A common method in making coefficient unit-free in political science is to use the standardized coefficient called the beta coefficient. We employed variable elasticity instead. Variable elasticity is the relative responsiveness of the dependent variable to change in the independent variables. We specified the functional form as linear in the logarithms of the variable to obtain elasticity.

Table 1 presents the estimates of coefficients of the socioeconomic neutrality model. The total socioeconomic biases in voting, campaign, and communal activities are 0.63, 0.72 and 0.77, respectively. These figures are obtained by adding up the figures under $\beta_j \gamma_{sje}$ column which indicate the independent contributions of social and psychological variables on the extent of

socioeconomic bias in participation. As we hypothesized, the extent of socioeconomic bias in participation was the combination of 1) independent effect of socioeconomic status on participation and 2) various socioeconomic biasing and neutralizing effects of sociological and psychological variables.

(Table 1 about here)

The table shows that the largest component of socioeconomic bias in participation is the independent effect of socioeconomic status on participation. The independent socioeconomic effects on voting, campaign, and communal activities are 0.47, 0.52 and 0.51, and they are statistically significant at more than 0.01 level. The independent socioeconomic effects account for 75%, 82% and 81% of the total socioeconomic bias in voting, campaign, and communal activities, respectively. In Participation in America, the authors concluded that upper socioeconomic citizens came to participate more in politics because they developed a set of civic attitudes which mobilizes them to participate. This socioeconomic model of politicization, according to Verba and Nie, worked best in more difficult acts such as campaign and communal activities in comparison to voting. Our data also supported this proposition, but the differences among voting and campaign and communal activities are not as large as what Verba and Nie emphasized.

Among different sociological and psychological variables, the most important variable is organizational involvement (OI). Organizational involvement significantly reinforces socioeconomic bias in participation. The more they get involved in organizations, the more they participate in all modes of political activities. Since there is a positive relationship between SES and OI, it reinforces socioeconomic biases in all modes of political participation. The finding is consistent with Verba and Nie's conclusion that affiliation with voluntary associations increased the participation gap between the haves

and the havenots significantly. It also supports their proposition that organizational affiliation is a potential source for reducing the participation gap between the advantaged and the disadvantaged. Since the biasing effect of OI came more from the high effect of OI on participation rather than OI/SES relationship, a small change in OI/SES relation could significantly alter the effect of OI on the extent of socioeconomic bias in participation. If OI/SES relationship were to be negative (e.g., recruiting the havenots to the organization), OI could even neutralize socioeconomic bias in participation. Achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation in the United States through manipulation of organizational structure is of theoretical as well as practical interest because organizational structure is susceptible to policy manipulation. Historically, governments have helped the development of political and non-political organizations such as farmers' associations and trade unions. In the next section, we develop necessary conditions for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulation of organizational structure.

Urbanism has different effects on different modes of political activities. Those who live in large communities participate less in communal activity while they tend to participate more in campaign activity. This implies that while urbanism corrects the socioeconomic bias in communal activity, it reinforces the bias in campaign activity because there is a positive relation between socioeconomic status and the size of communities where the respondents live. The effect of urbanism on voting is small and insignificant. Our finding is not comparable with that of Verba and Nie because we treated the size of community only whereas they treated both the size and degree of isolation of community as an independent variable.

Our data support the generalization that women are less politically active than men. However, as we indicated before, this variable is not included in our

socioeconomic bias model, therefore, it is of incidental interest.

The effect of black consciousness on participation and on socioeconomic bias in participation is not straightforward. It has a positive effect on campaign activity and communal activity whereas it has negative effect on voting. However, its effect on campaign activity is not statistically significant. Since there is a negative relationship between black consciousness and SES, it reinforces socioeconomic bias in voting whereas it neutralizes the bias in communal activity. Verba and Nie found that black participation increased the participation disparity between the haves and the havenots in voting whereas it decreased it in campaign and communal activities. In general, our findings are consistent with the above but a statistical test shows that the effects of black participation on the participation gap between the haves and the havenots in campaign activity was not statistically significant at 0.05 level. However, since we measured the extent of black consciousness differently, the finding is not directly comparable with that of Verba and Nie's.

Democratic party identifiers participate significantly more in voting and campaign activity. Its effect on communal activity is small and statistically insignificant. Since there is a negative relation between Democratic Party identifiers and socioeconomic status, it neutralizes the bias in voting and campaign activity. Republicans also participate more in politics. Its independent effect on voting, campaign, and communal activities is positive and statistically significant. Contrary to Democratic Party identifiers, there is a positive relationship between Republican Party identifiers and socioeconomic status which implies that Republican Party identification reinforces socioeconomic bias in voting, campaign, and communal activities. Our findings were somewhat different from Verba and Nie's with respect to the effect of party

identification. They found that party identification reduced the participation disparity between the haves and the havenots in voting, not in more difficult acts. We found that Democratic party identification decreased the disparity in voting and campaign activity whereas Republican party identification increased the disparity in voting, campaign and communal activities.

The effects of social and psychological variables on the extent of socioeconomic bias in participation is summarized in Figure 2.

(Figure 2 about here)

Organizational involvement reinforced 47%, 44% and 65% of the independent socioeconomic bias in voting, campaign, and communal activities. Republican Party identification also reinforced 15%, 14% and 4% of the independent effect of socioeconomic status in voting, campaign, and communal activities. On the other hand, Democratic Party identification neutralized 32% and 19% of the independent socioeconomic effect in voting and campaign activities. Urbanism also neutralized 8% of the independent socioeconomic bias in communal activity. The effect of black consciousness on the extent of socioeconomic bias was mode specific. It neutralized 8% of the independent socioeconomic bias in communal activity whereas it reinforced 6% of the bias in voting activity.

The above findings are interesting in themselves but of only incidental interest in the present paper. Our focus is a more normative one; an approach to socioeconomic neutrality in political participation. In the next section, we develop necessary conditions for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulation of organizational structure.

Approach to Socioeconomic Neutrality in Participation

This section develops necessary conditions for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulating organizational structure in the United States. According to Verba and Nie, organizations are an "important potential source for reducing the participation gap between the socially advantaged and disadvantaged. As our data show, the latter gain more in their political participation through organizations than do more advantaged groups.

If rate of membership among the disadvantaged were to increase, the net effect would be to reduce the political participation disparity." (Verba and Nie, 1972, p.208)

Nie, Powell and Prewitt also generalized the relationship among socioeconomic status, organizational involvement and representation of the lower classes in political system as follows(Nie, Powell and Prewitt,1969):

1. The higher the total organizational level, the less the lower classes are under-represented.
2. The higher the correlation between socioeconomic status and organizational membership, the more under-represented the lower classes.
3. The smaller the size of lower classes, the less the lower classes are under-represented.

Our socioeconomic neutrality model suggests a somewhat different generalization about the relationship among SES, OI and the representation of the lower classes in the political system. Equation 3 developed before can be rewritten as:

$$\alpha_1 = \beta_1 + \beta_2 \gamma_{oe} + \sum_{j=3}^k \beta_j \gamma_{s_j e} \quad \text{--- (4)}$$

where β_2 is the independent effect of OI on the rate of participation, γ_{oe} is the OI/SES relationship, $\sum_{j=3}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje}$ is the effects of other social and psychological variables other than OI on the extent of socioeconomic bias in participation. Equation 4 states that the extent of lower class representation measured by socioeconomic neutrality coefficient (α_1) is dependent on:

1. The independent effect of SES on participation (β_1): the smaller β_1 , the greater the socioeconomic neutrality;
2. The independent effect of OI on participation (β_2) and OI/SES relation (γ_{oe}): the smaller $\beta_2 \gamma_{oe}$, the greater the socioeconomic neutrality;
3. The indirect effect on SES on participation through other social and psychological variables ($\sum_{j=3}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje}$): the smaller the above, the greater the socioeconomic neutrality.

Equation 4 implies that theoretically, we can achieve any degree of socioeconomic neutrality in participation by manipulating the OI/SES relationship. If we were to achieve a complete socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulation of the OI/SES relationship, we can set α_1 to be zero and then manipulate equation 4 in terms of γ_{oe} as follow:

$$\gamma_{oe} = -\left(\frac{\beta_1 + \sum_{j=3}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje}}{\beta_2}\right) \quad \text{--- (5)}$$

Equation 5 offers necessary conditions for achieving socioeconomic neutrality in participation through manipulation of OI/SES relationship. They are:

1. The independent effect of SES on participation, β_1 is small.
2. The indirect effect of SES on participation through other social and psychological variables, $\sum_{j=3}^k \beta_j \gamma_{sje}$ is small;
3. The independent effect of OI on participation, β_2 is large.

Does the participatory structure in the United States meet the above conditions? Table 1 shown in the previous section suggests that actual γ_{oe} in the United States is 0.27. Without manipulation of the OI/SES relationship, socioeconomic bias in voting, campaign, and communal activities are 0.63, 0.72 and 0.77, respectively. Relatively high β_2 implies that the extent of lower class representation in political system increases substantially by small change in OI/SES relation. Empirical estimates of coefficients shown in Table 1 suggest that a complete socioeconomic neutrality in voting, campaign, and communal activities can be achieved with γ_{oe} of -0.51, -0.57 and -0.35, respectively. This implies that the socioeconomically disadvantaged groups should be more involved in organizations if a complete socioeconomic neutrality in participation were to be achieved.

Let us now turn to the question: What type of organizations best meet necessary conditions, namely that the independent effect of OI in the particular organization on participation is high while the OI/SES relationship is low, preferably negative.

In the United States, there are many kinds of organizations and " a rich associational life has been considered the hallmark of American democracy " (Verba and Nie, 1972, p.174). Table 2 lists 14 different kinds of organizations with

(Table 2 about here)

percentage of the population who report membership, the extent of socioeconomic bias in organizational membership, and the effect of OI on participation. The Table shows that religious organizations and ethnic organizations and, to a lesser extent, farm organizations, meet necessary conditions. There is no socioeconomic bias in the membership of those organizations and the membership enhances political participation.

Joining organizations is an irrational act according to Mancur Olson (1965). Olson argues that it is always irrational for an individual to join an

organization if the purpose of the organization is collective because the individuals are motivated by rational self-interest. If the outcome is collective, the benefits do not accrue to individuals in relation to their contribution. No matter how hard a particular individual works to achieve an objective, everyone benefits if he is successful. In a movement which is wholly collective, the rational individual withholds his effort because he knows he will benefit anyway: he will be a free rider.

However, James Q. Wilson is critical of Olson's argument. Wilson thinks that people join organizations in response to different kinds of incentives, such as material, solidarity and purposeful incentives. Material incentives are "tangible rewards: money, or things and services readily priced in monetary terms." Whereas solidarity incentives are intangible rewards: sociability, prestige, status and power come from joining organizations. On the other hand, purposeful incentives are "intangible rewards that derive from the sense of satisfaction of having contributed to the attainment of a worthwhile cause." (Wilson, 1973, p.34).

The organizational data suggest that different SES groups respond to those incentives differently. In other words, the higher SES groups seem to respond to solidarity (or other) incentives offered by those fraternal, school service and other organizations more frequently than the lower SES groups. This causes SES biases in the memberships of these organizations. On the other hand, the incentives offered by the traditional or pre-industrial organizations such as ethnic and religious organizations tend to draw responses crosscutting income line. We would argue that ethnic and religious organizations offer what we call "subculture consciousness", a sense of homogeneity among the members but a feeling of separation from the majority of the population. Subculture consciousness that is conflictual and divisive (e.g., feeling of us vs. them) mobilizes people to participate.

So far we have not mentioned an important organization which meets the necessary conditions, the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is to some extent successful in mobilizing the lower SES groups in politics as shown in Table 1. However, there is a limit to which the U.S. party system can fully mobilize the disadvantaged groups in politics. Historically, European political parties have based their powers on the mobilization of subcultural consciousness (e.g., religious and working class consciousness). Polarized and divisive issues aligned with partisan alternatives, and every group in society required partisan definition. Thus party leaders tried to cultivate and appeal to subcultural consciousness in order to maximize votes. Whereas, in the United States, we have the majoritarian two-party system where party leaders avoid conflictual and divisive issues to minimize the intensity of subcultural consciousness in order to draw votes crosscutting different subcultures. A lack of conflict, and under-representation of lower classes in the United States political system are the key criticism of E. E. Schattschneider:

"Political leaders and parties have the responsibility for organizing conflict, by raising the visibility and intensity of conflict and by advancing the issues that set its direction. Interest groups will not do so, because the most powerful of them prefer the privatization of conflict. The traditional nonideological parties have also failed, because they have not raised the great "public interest" issues that involve most Americans. As a result, large numbers of Americans have ignored elections....the nonvoters are drawn disproportionately from among the young, the poor and the radical minorities."

(Schattschneider, 1960, p. xxv).

An interesting finding in Table 2 is that the more traditional and preindustrial organizations such as religious and ethnic organizations drew membership crosscutting socioeconomic lines. This leads to another important

hypothesis: that socioeconomic neutrality in participation is not necessarily a positive function of economic development because the distribution of traditional and pre-industrial organizational membership is not a positive function of economic development. To test the above hypothesis, we regressed the extent of socioeconomic neutrality in participation with the level of economic development. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the above two variables.

(Figure 3 about here)

Horizontal line indicates the level of economic development measured in GNP per capita in 1965, and the vertical line shows the extent of socioeconomic bias in overall political participation for nine nations. Although the sample is small, the result supports the hypothesis that the relationship between economic development and socioeconomic bias in participation is not significant. It even shows a positive relationship between economic development and socioeconomic bias in participation.

The finding is interesting because many studies showed a positive relationship between democratic performance and economic development (Deutsch, 1961; Jackman, 1975). However, The idea of socioeconomic neutrality in participation is different from the democratic performance measured in the above studies. Socioeconomic neutrality in participation measures the extent to which the have-nots take participatory opportunities, whereas democratic performance in the above studies was measured as the extent to which society offers participatory opportunities such as expansion of right to vote, organize, and the freedom of press. In any event, the extent to which the have-nots take participatory opportunities is not positively related to economic development, implying that socioeconomic neutrality in participation will not be brought simply by time. As long as there is skewed distribution of socioeconomic status, a manipulation of organizational structure may be necessary if more

socioeconomic neutrality in participation is desired. Historically, the United States government helped organize such programs as "War on Poverty" and "Community Action Program" in the mid-sixties which tended to include the lower classes into organization.

The final question is how the idea of socioeconomic neutrality in participation differs from other democratic theories. The idea of socioeconomic neutrality is in direct conflict with the recent argument to restore governability in the United States political system. Huntington argued that an effective operation of democracy required the balance between government authority and political demands from the public (Huntington, 1976). He said that the United States was a good example of balancing these two conflicting forces successfully. Huntington sees that the balance between authority and political demands in the United States has begun to collapse because there was an excess of participation from marginal population on one hand and a substantial decrease in government authority on the other. He thus argued that excess participation from marginal population should be restricted to restore efficiency and effectiveness of democracy in the United States.

Socioeconomic neutrality in participation is also in conflict with the elite theory of democracy. Elitists argue that for the stability of democracy, participation from the mass public, especially from the lower classes, should be restricted. (Schumpeter, 1943; Eckstein, 1961; Lipset, 1960). This argument is based on the assumption that the lower classes are an anti-democratic force. Democracy requires, according to elitists, a high level of political tolerance among citizens and moderate tension among its contending political forces, but the lower classes are not politically tolerant due to their isolated environment and economic and psychological insecurity (Lipset, 1960).

The idea of socioeconomic neutrality in participation differs from the theory of participatory democracy in two ways. The theory of participatory

democracy hopes to achieve full participation of citizens in a political system. If it were to be achieved, there would be political equality not only across socioeconomic lines but also in other population segments such as religious, geographic and ethnic cleavages. But socioeconomic neutrality in participation prefers political equality on the basis of socioeconomic status rather than on other forms of political equalities. Another point on which the theory of participatory democracy differs from socioeconomic neutrality is that the former emphasizes the educative role of participation whereas the latter places an emphasis on the instrumentality of political participation.

The idea of socioeconomic neutrality in participation tends to be more radical than many of the democratic theories but less radical than the Marxist school of thought which prefers a negative socioeconomic bias in political participation.

Whether we should achieve socioeconomic neutrality in political participation is a normative question and answering this question is beyond the objective of the present paper. However, findings of this paper can offer empirical bases for normative discussions. The participatory structure in the United States is highly biased. The higher the socioeconomic level, the more they participate in politics. This tendency does not seem to be corrected simply by time. However, the political system in the United States meets the necessary conditions to achieve socioeconomic neutrality in political participation through manipulation of organizational structure.

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



Figure 1

The Relationship between SES and Participation as Affected by a Hypothetical Variable X

Figure 2

Effect of Social and Psychological variables
on the Socioeconomic Neutrality in Participation



Socio-economic Bias




Figure 3

Crossnational Comparison of Socioeconomic Bias in Political Participation

Source: Verba and Nie, Participation in America, 1972, p. 340 for the data on socio-economic neutrality and Taylor and Hudson, World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd ed.), 1972, p. 314 for the level of economic development.

Table 1

The Sociological Sources of Socioeconomic Neutrality
in three Modes of Political Activities in the United States

Variables	γ_{sje}	Voting		Campaign		Communal	
		β_j	$\beta_j \gamma_{sje}$	β_{j2}	$\beta_j \gamma_{sje}$	β_j	$\beta_j \gamma_{sje}$
SES	1.00 (124)	0.47 (52)	0.47	0.52 (54)	0.52	0.51 (51)	0.51
Organization	0.27 (329)	0.83 (115)	0.22	0.86 (109)	0.23	1.23 (211)	0.33
Community size	0.14 (33)	-0.04 (1)	-0.01	0.10 (3)	0.01	-0.26 (21)	-0.04
Female	--	-0.22 (10)	--	-0.25 (11)	--	-0.27 (12)	--
Blacks	-0.12 (124)	-0.22 (4)	0.03	0.09 (1)	-0.01	0.34 (7)	-0.04
Democrats	-0.14 (88)	1.05 (122)	-0.15	0.73 (51)	-0.10	0.07 (0)	-0.01
Republicans	0.06 (23)	1.11 (104)	0.07	1.10 (90)	0.07	0.38 (10)	0.02
Total Socioeconomic Neutrality			0.63		0.72		0.77

Figure in parentheses are F values.

Table 2

Effect of organizational Involvement on Overall
Political Participation

Organizations	%of population	γ_{oe}	β_o
Union	17	0.14	0.14
Veterans'	7	0.05	0.18
Literacy, Art	4	0.06	0.58
Sport clubs	12	0.17	0.12
Fraternal	15	0.11	0.30
Religious	6	0	0.15

Youth	7	0.13	0.29
School Service	17	0.26	0.26
Hobby clubs	5	0.06	0.17
Prof. & Academic	7	0.13	0.52
Ethnic	2	0	0.20

Service clubs	6	0.08	0.47
Farm	4	0.02	0.44
School fraternities	3	0.05	0.30

Table 1

The Sociological Sources of Socioeconomic Neutrality
in three Modes of Political Activities in the United States

Variables	γ_{sje}	Voting		Campaign		Communal	
		β_{j1}	$\beta_{j1}\gamma_{sje}$	β_{j2}	$\beta_{j2}\gamma_{sje}$	β_{j3}	$\beta_{j3}\gamma_{sje}$
SES	1.00 (124)	0.47 (52)	0.47	0.52 (54)	0.52	0.51 (51)	0.51
Organization	0.27 (329)	0.83 (115)	0.22	0.86 (109)	0.23	1.23 (211)	0.33
Community size	0.14 (33)	-0.04 (1)	-0.01	0.10 (3)	0.01	-0.26 (21)	-0.04
Female	--	-0.22 (10)	--	-0.25 (11)	--	-0.27 (12)	--
Blacks	-0.12 (124)	-0.22 (4)	0.03	0.09 (1)	-0.01	0.34 (7)	-0.04
Democrats	-0.14 (88)	1.05 (122)	-0.15	0.73 (51)	-0.10	0.07 (0)	-0.01
Republicans	0.06 (23)	1.11 (104)	0.07	1.10 (90)	0.07	0.38 (10)	0.02
Total Socioeconomic Neutrality			0.63		0.72		0.77

Figure in parentheses are F values.