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Income Distribution and
Political Participation in
the Process of Socioeconomic Mobilization

by
Ikuo Kabashima

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Introduction

Achieving high level of economic development, socioeconomic equality and democratic performance is a common goal for many societies. But the problem is that these three goals are not easily compatible. In the fifties and sixties, development strategists thought economic development, socioeconomic equality and democracy went together. Since economic development generally leads equality and democracy, it was clear to the developing countries that they should concentrate their attention on rapid growth. This was indeed the choice made by many developing countries. Economic growth has been given priority in the fifties and sixties. Now the question is: Have equality and democracy followed economic development? With respect to a relationship between economic development and socioeconomic equality, R. S. McNamara, the former president of the World Bank stated:

"It is becoming increasingly clear that the critical issue within developing countries is not simply the pace of growth, but the nature of growth. The developing nations achieved an overall average annual GNP growth rate of more than the targeted 5% by the end of the sixties. But the social impact of that growth was so severely skewed, and the numbers of individuals all but passed by so absolutely immense, the simple statistical achievement of that target was misleading." (No Easy Choice, Huntington and Nelson, 1977, p.2).

Brazil's case has been frequently cited as an example of the incompatibility of rapid economic growth and income equality. Her recent economic growth has been labelled the "Brazilian Economic Miracle". Yet when it comes to the question of income distribution, some segments of the population do not share the benefits of economic growth (Fishlow, 1972; Robock, 1975).

Huntington and Nelson argued that an achievement of equitable growth was mainly a political problem. The extension of political rights to the disadvantaged groups would lead to a reorientation of social and economic policies and programs in favor of these groups since they would reveal their preferences in political system (Huntington and Nelson, 1977).

Limited studies of the effect of democracy on socioeconomic equality, however, suggested that the former had little effect on the latter (Adelman and Morris, 1973; Jackman, 1975). Jackman studied the relations among economic development, socioeconomic equality and democratic performance and found that there was a significant bivariate relationship between democracy and socioeconomic equality. But he then found this relationship to be spurious because economic development was positively related to both socioeconomic equality and democratic performance.

This paper too explores the relation between political participation and economic equality but from somewhat different perspective. We will ascertain the effect of overall process of socioeconomic mobilization on income distribution and the role played by political participation in that process. We ask: To what extent do economic development, the corresponding social changes and political participation, independently and jointly, influence the pattern of income distribution.

Model and Data

The first step to approach this objective is to postulate a model showing how the socioeconomic and political variable in the mobilization

process independently and jointly influence income distribution. The current model relies on the social mobilization theory. Social mobilization is a process of changes:

"Such as changes of residence, of occupation, of social setting, face to face association, of institution, roles, and way of acting, of experiences and expectations ... go together in certain historical situations and stages of economic development". (Deutsch, 1961).

This mobilization, according to Deutsch, increases the rate of political participation. We hypothesize that this process of socioeconomic and political mobilization influences income distribution.

Our hypothesis can be expressed by simple statistical equations. Since social mobilization in society (S_{tj}) follows economic development (E_t), we can express the relationship as:

$$(1) \quad \ln S_{tj} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} \ln E_t + u_{1tj} \quad (j=1, 2, 3)$$

where β_{0j} is a constant, u_{1tj} is a residual which is unrelated to E_t .

Political participation (P_t) is also related to socioeconomic mobilization:

$$(2) \quad \ln P_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \ln E_t + \sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha_{j+1} \ln S_{tj} + u_{2t}$$

where α_0 is constant and u_{2t} is residual which is unrelated to E_t and S_{tj} . The main hypothesis is that the above process of socioeconomic and political mobilization influences income distribution:

$$(3) \quad \ln G_t = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 \ln E_t + \sum_{j=1}^3 \gamma_{j+1} \ln S_{tj} + \gamma_5 \ln P_t + \sum_{K=1}^3 \gamma_{K+5} D_{Kt} + u_t$$

Equation 3 implies that the extent of income inequality (G_t) is related to economic development, accompanying socio-political mobilization and

some qualitative variables (D_{kt}) where $k=1$, $k=2$ and $k=3$ are regularity and competitiveness of elections, capitalist countries, and underdeveloped economies with GNP per capita less than \$ 300 respectively. Again u_{3t} is unrelated to independent variables in the equation. We want to ascertain the extent to which economic development, the corresponding social changes and political participation, independently and jointly influence income inequality. Thus by substituting equation 1 and 2 into 3, and by differentiating it with respect to economic development, we get:

$$(4) \quad \frac{d \ln G_t}{d \ln E_t} = \gamma_1 + \sum_{j=1}^3 \gamma_{j+1} \beta_{1j} + \gamma_5 \left(\alpha_1 + \sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha_{j+1} \beta_{1j} \right)$$

Equation 4 suggests that there are three different pathes for the process of economic development to influence income distribution.

The first path is the direct effect of economic development independent of socio-political changes. This path is shown by γ_1 in Equation 4. Is it possible for a society to experience economic development unaccompanied by socio-political development? Good example is Kuwait where per capita income is extremely high (rank second in the 1960's) and where there is a low rate of literacy (70th) and low degree of masscommunication measured by the volume of newspaper circulation (67th). The question here is: what is the effect of this path on income distribution? We expect that the effect of path 1 on income equality to be negative, since the majority of the country's population is not included in the process of economic development in this case. Those who are included in the process enjoy the benefit of growth, whereas those who are not are excluded from the benefit of growth. Baran's observation of oil producing countries noted this point:

"... in many places oil companies and mining concerns have provided relatively superior housing for their employees, have built schools, hospitals, movie theaters, and the like. Yet as far as the welfare of the native populations is concerned, the importance of this type of company spending tends to be grossly exaggerated ... in any case, the number of people allegedly basking in the sun of corporate generosity constitutes, as we have seen earlier, a tiny proportion of the countries' total population." (Baran, 1957, p.216, underlined by author).

The second path is the indirect effect of economic development through corresponding changes in social structure. This path is shown as $\sum_{j=1}^3 \gamma_{j+1} \beta_{lj}$ in Equation 4. We hypothesize that three sociological variables, urbanization (j=1), education (j=2) and masscommunication (j=3) accompany economic development and influence income distribution.

The size of the urban sector (UB) is an important factor in the determination of income distribution. Kuznets argued that in the very early stage of growth, the relationship between income inequality and economic development is positive. This is because income inequality in the agricultural sector is narrower than that of the urban sector, and as economy grows, significant urbanization follows. However, this positive trend is reversed after the certain stage of development (Kuznets, 1956). We hypothesize that this turning point occurs, not because income distribution in the urban sector becomes more equal than that of the agricultural sector, but because significant socioeconomic and political structure changes occurs from further economic development. We hypothesize that the independent effect of urbanization throughout the process of economic development on income inequality is positive. The extent of urbanization is measured by the percent of people living in cities with more than a hundred thousand people.

The level of education (ED) is hypothesized to accompany economic

development and to influence income distribution. More precisely speaking, equality in the distribution of education should be an important source for determining income distribution. Although, a direct measurement of equality in educational distribution is not available, we feel that an indicator such as literacy rate will serve for the present purpose.

Employment of literacy as the measurement of the equality in educational distribution would be inadequate for highly advanced countries, most of which show extremely high literacy rates without enough variation among them. However, the use of other available data such as the percentage of population finishing second and third levels of schooling is limited for the following reasons:

- 1) The size of the sample with respect to the above information is small. This, combined with the relatively small size of income distribution data, drastically reduces the number of countries available for a meaningful analysis.
- 2) The above information may offer adequate variation among the advanced countries, but it offers relatively little variation among the developing countries.

Another measurement such as the school enrollment ratio is also available. However, the choice between literacy and school enrollment ratios is a choice between the past effort and the current effort of a society to educate its population. What the school enrollment ratio offers is a figure based on school age children, whereas literacy figures show what percentage of adults has been educated. Although we are not totally satisfied with the use of the literacy rate for the present model, among the alternatives available to us, the choice of literacy seems

most appropriate.

The extent of masscommunication is also hypothesized to accompany economic development and to influence income distribution. The present model employs the volume of newspaper circulation as the measurement of the extent of masscommunication. Other measurements are available such as the numbers of the T. V. and radio audiences, but we feel that the volume of newspapers circulation is more adequate for our model. Newspaper circulation indicates the number of active participants in consuming information as opposed to the number of passive participants. We assume that the extent of masscommunication has a significant impact on income distribution because of the presence of active audiences. The volume of newspaper circulation includes two aspects of information: 1) absolute level of information flow and 2) the number of capable information receivers. The former has a direct impact on income distribution since government policy makers perceive reports on media as if they were the opinions of the public. The pressure felt by the decision makers is dependent on the volume of circulation (it is also dependent on the editorial line, but we have assumed that the editorial lines of most respected newspapers are liberal with respect to income distribution). The number of capable information receivers is closely related to the educational level of a country, but it is somewhat higher than the literacy rate. The incentive to consume newspapers requires more than the basic skill of reading and writing. It probably requires more than primary education. Thus where the literacy rate measures the level of educational stock completing primary schooling, the volume of newspaper circulation would measure the level of education beyond that point. It is possible to

distinguish conceptually two dimensions of masscommunication but it is not possible to distinguish them empirically. In any event, we hypothesize that the extent of masscommunication measured by the volume of newspaper circulation have a positive impact on income equality.

The impact of economic development on income distribution through path 3 consists of: 1) the influence of economic development on social structure, 2) the subsequent influence of social structure on political participation and 3) the consequent influence of political participation on income distribution. This path is shown as $\gamma_5[\alpha_1 + \sum_{j=1}^3 \alpha_{j+1} \beta_{1j}]$ in Equation 4.

The main theme of the present study is to explore the relationship between political participation and income distribution. We measure the rate of political participation by voter's turnout of a country. Although voter turnout does not accurately reflect the different dimensions of political participation (Verba and Nie, 1972), this is only available measurement of political participation on large scale. Why is voter turnout related to income distribution? We assume that the greater the voter turnout, the greater the probability of including the preferences of the less well-off segments of the population. And the more these people reveal their preferences in the political system, the more reorientation of social and economic policies and programs there is to benefit the economically disadvantaged people. The question is: Are we repeating Jackman's analysis of the relations among economic development, socioeconomic equality and democratic performance? The answer is negative. Jackman analyzed the relationship between socioeconomic equality and what I call institutional inclusiveness; that is the extent to which a

society meets the prerequisites for democracy such as competitiveness of political system, freedom of press and right to participate. We want to ascertain the relationship between income inequality and political inclusiveness in behavioral sense; that is the extent to which the preferences of the disadvantaged as well as the advantaged are revealed in the political system while prerequisites for democracy are held constant.

Before we proceed with the estimation, several weaknesses of the model should be noted. The current model hypothesizes that social structure and participatory structure is a function of economic development. However, it has been argued that the achievable level of economic development is also a function of the extent of education and mass-communication, meaning that there is a reciprocal relationship between economic development and the nature of social structure. However, the possible reciprocal relationship between economic development and social structure need not concern us seriously since we are not interested in the relationship between them per se. Rather what we want to ascertain is: Does the effect of socio-political mobilization, accompanied by/with economic development, influence income distribution? This causal relationship is assumed to be hierarchical.

The second problem of estimating the model is the problem of multicollinearity. The estimation of the present model requires us to ascertain the independent effects of economic development, literacy, urbanization and masscommunication on income inequality and participation. However, a serious problem of multicollinearity arises when the correlations among independent variables are very high. When we have a multicollinearity it is difficult to ascertain the independent effect of one variable

while holding other variables constant since correlated variables tends to behave together. However, multicollinearity simulation done by Hanushek and Jackson suggests that multicollinearity increases the observed standard error but parameter estimates remain unbiased (Hanushek and Jackson, 1977). This implies that in computing the effects of the different paths on the pattern of income distribution, we should not exclude the impact of variables simply because their t-statistics are low.

The structural model prefers a unit free measurement. A common method to make coefficients unit free in political science is to use the standardized regression coefficient. The problem with this approach is that the sample with large deviations in one of the independent variables will show a greater beta coefficient for that variable when other conditions are held constant. In this paper, we employed variable elasticity instead. Variable elasticity is the relative responsiveness of the dependent variable to changes in the independent variable. We specify the functional form as linear in the logarithms of the variables to get variable elasticity.

We use the income distribution data compiled by Shail Jain of the World Bank (Jain, 1975). It includes a relatively large number of countries in both the communist and non-communist countries which permits relatively reliable quantitative analysis. We employed income distribution data based on distribution of family income sampled from the national population between 1960 and 1970 (or around this period). The primary source of the data on socio-economic variables is the World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators (2nd ed.) compiled by Taylor and Hudson (1972).

Empirical Estimates of the Model

The estimates of the coefficients in the model are shown in Table 1. We will discuss the results of estimation of the effects of economic development on income distribution through different paths step by step.

1. The Effect of Path 1

The estimate for the effect of economic development through path 1 is shown in Table 1. Equation 1 shows the parameter estimate for the bivariate relationship between economic development and Gini ratio. It suggests that a percent increase in the level of economic development measured in GNP per capita would decrease the Gini coefficient by 0.12 percent. From similar observations, many studies have tended to conclude that economic development was indeed good medicine for narrowing income inequality. However, as shown in Equation 2, the inclusion of other socio-political variables accompanying economic development, reduces the independent effect of economic development on income inequality from -0.13 to -0.02 and the t-statistic suggests that the relationship is not even statistically significant. To sum up the impact of economic growth on income distribution through path 1, we would say that economic development without significant changes in socio-political structure had a minimum impact on income inequality.

2. Effect of Path 2

The effect of economic development on income distribution through path 2 consists of: 1) the impact of economic development on the nature of social structure and 2) the subsequent impact of the nature of social structure on income inequality.

Table 1

Income Inequality and Socio-political Mobilization Coefficient

Equation Variables	(1) Gini	(2) Gini	(3) Masscomm.	(4) Literacy	(5) Urbani- zation	(6) Voting Par- ticipation
Economic Development	-0.12*	-0.02	1.25*	0.49*	0.49*	0.06
Mass- Communication		-0.15*				---
Literacy		0.05				-0.10
Urbani- zation		0.06				-0.06
Voting Par- ticipation		-0.36*				
D ₁	0.59*	0.48*				-0.10
D ₂	-0.10	-0.25*				-0.06
D ₃		0.03				0.11
Adjusted R ²	0.64	0.74	0.74	0.52	0.50	0.11

* Significant at 0.05 level

N = 36

--- = The size of coefficient is less than 0.01

D₁ : 1 for Capitalist Countries and 0 otherwise.


D₂ : 1 for Countries with GNP per capita less than \$300 and 0 otherwise.

D₃ : 1 for countries with relatively high Competitive election and 0 otherwise.

Equation 3 through 5 confirm our hypothesis that the nature of social structure reflected in MA, ED and UB is significantly affected by the extent of economic development. Coefficients 1.25, 0.49 and 0.49 for MA, ED and UB indicate that, for a one percent increase in economic development, we can expect 1.25, 0.49 and 0.49 percent increase in MA, ED and UB respectively. The t-values suggest that the relationship between economic development and these social variables are statistically significant.

The effects of social structure on income inequality are not uniform. As we expected, the extent of masscommunication lessens income inequality. The coefficient suggests that for a one percent increase in MA, we can expect 0.15% decrease in Gini ratio. The t-statistic implies that this relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. On the other hand, the level of education and urbanization increase income inequality but the effects of these variables on income inequality are not statistically significant.

The estimate of the coefficients shows that the magnitude of the total impact of economic development on income inequality through path 2 is -0.15. The process of equalization of income through path 2 is shown in the following diagram.



$$\sum_{j=1}^3 \gamma_{j+1} \beta_{1j} = -0.15$$

The diagram offers several observations:

- 1) The relatively large effect of path 2 on income inequality implies that economic development without significant social structure change will result in a minimum equalizing effect.
- 2) The relatively large effect of masscommunication on income inequality implies that development of masscommunication in terms of information flow and capable information receivers is an important factor in narrowing income inequality along with economic development.

3. Effect of Path 3


The effect of economic development on income distribution through path 3 consists of: 1) the effect of economic development on the nature of social structure; 2) the subsequent impact of the nature of social structure on political participation and 3) the subsequent impact of political participation on income inequality.

Equation 2 confirms our hypothesis that the extent of political participation significantly lessens income inequality. The coefficient of -0.36 indicates that we expect a one percent increase in the rate of voting participation to result in a decline of the Gini coefficient by 0.36% . Not only the relationship is statistically significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient is the greatest among variables influencing income distribution.

On the other hand, equation 6 runs counter to our expectation. We expected, from the mobilization model, that the modernization process would increase the rate of participation. However, the literacy rate tends to have a negative effect on the rate of voting participation. Urbanization is an important aspect of modernization but its effect on

the rate of participation is by no means great, or even systematic. The extent of masscommunication also has a insignificant effect on the rate of voting participation. The independent effect of economic development on the rate of participation is low and not statistically significant.

The analysis shows that the magnitude of the effect of economic development on income inequality through path 3 is 0.005. The process of equalization of income through path 3 is shown below.



The above diagram shows that:

- 1) The impact of economic development on income distribution through path 3 is minor.
- 2) However, this insignificant effect is not due to the fact that impact of political participation on income distribution is small but due to fact that there is an intermission between social economic development and political participation.
- 3) The relatively great impact of political participation on income distribution implies that in countries where economic development is high, accompanying social structure changes are great and political

mobilization follows, a relatively large decline of income inequality accompanies economic development.

4. Effect of Qualitative Variables

Thus far we have analyzed the effects of quantifiable variables on income distribution while disregarding the effects of qualitative variables, such as difference in political system (capitalist vs. communist) underdeveloped (less than \$300 GNP per capita) and developing-developed countries, and competitiveness and regularity of elections. Equation 2 shows the effects of these variables on Gini coefficients. Income in the capitalist system on average is less equally distributed. The table shows that Gini ratio in the capitalist countries are 50 percent higher than those in communist countries. This relationship is statistically significant at 0.05 level. Income in underdeveloped economies in general is more equally distributed than the developing-developed economies. For example, Gini ratios in underdeveloped economies are on average 25 percent lower than more advanced economies.

However, a good part of the above finding that the capitalist system works against the lower class is to be expected. What is interesting is the effect of the regularity and competitiveness of elections on income distribution. The effect is found to be minor and not statistically significant. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis that not the preconditions for democracy but participation is important in achieving greater income equality. Offering such a freely competitive elections is not more than the necessary condition for the poor people to influence the government decision makings to improve their relative economic positions. What is important is extent to which these people take participatory

to which these people take participatory opportunities. The finding also explains why some studies found little empirical relationship between democratic performance and income equality. Because they measured the extent of democracy by the preconditions for democracy; the right to vote, the competitiveness and regularity of elections and freedom of press. These are the necessary conditions but not sufficient conditions.

Socio-economic and Political Mobilization and the

Different Measurements of Income Distribution

We have thus far analyzed the effect of socio-economic and political mobilization on income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient. There are, however, many ways that the mobilization process can affect income distribution. It can redistribute the share of income of the few rich people mainly to the 1) middle class or 2) lower class or 3) both middle class and lower class. We expect that the effect of socio-economic mobilization on income distribution and the role played by political participation will be different if we take different dependent variables (i.e., the share of income of the top five percent, the middle 20 percent or the lowest 20 percent). A summary measure such as the Gini coefficient can not capture possible distinctions.

We create six new dependent variables--total income goes to the top five percent, to the top 20 percent, to the second 20 percent, to the middle 20 percent, to the fourth 20 percent and the lowest 20 percent. The effects of socio-economic and political mobilization on the above dependent variables are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

The Effects of Socio-economic and Political Mobilization
on the Different-Shares-of-Income Groups

Independent Variables	Developed Variables					
	Top 5%	Top 20%	Second 20%	Middle 20%	Fourth 20%	Lowest 20%
Economic devel.	-0.05(0.7) ^t	-0.00(0) ^t	0.01(0.3) ^t	0.00(0.0) ^t	0.00(0.0) ^t	0.14(1.1) ^t
Literacy	0.02(0.1)	0.04(0.6)	-0.01(0.1)	-0.04(0.5)	-0.03(0.2)	0.21(1.0)
Masscommunication	-0.24(3.0)	-0.12(2.4)	0.08(2.9)	0.15(2.9)	0.19(2.4)	0.04(0.3)
Urbanization	0.08(1.0)	0.03(0.6)	-0.02(0.8)	-0.05(1.0)	-0.07(0.9)	-0.11(0.8)
Pol. inclusiveness	-0.51(2.5)	-0.23(1.8)	0.16(2.2)	0.32(2.4)	0.44(2.2)	0.72(2.0)
Capitalist system	0.20(1.1)	0.13(1.1)	0.11(1.6)	-0.16(1.2)	-0.44(2.3)	-0.81(2.4)
Underdeveloped econ.	-0.31(2.1)	-0.09(0.9)	0.07(1.4)	0.18(1.9)	0.30(2.0)	0.50(1.9)
Competitiveness and regularity of elections	-0.20(1.4)	-0.11(1.1)	0.10(1.9)	-0.03(0.3)	-0.17(1.1)	-0.44(1.7)
Adjusted R ²	0.73	0.59	0.58	0.58	0.55	0.37

The independent effects of economic development on groups with different shares of income are not significant. The effect tends to be negative on the share of the upper most income group, whereas the effect is positive on the lowest income group, but in any case, both the magnitude of the coefficients and t-values are not great.

The effects of literacy on the different-shares-of-income groups are not statistically significant and the direction of the effect is not clear. The effect of masscommunication on income distribution strongly progresses toward equality. The effect is largely negative for the upper income groups whereas it is positive for the middle income groups. The magnitudes of the effect are high and they are statistically significant except for that on the lowest income group. The effect on the share of income of the lowest income group is tends to be positive but it is not statistically significant. On the other hand, urbanization tends to benefit the upper income groups although the relationship is not statistically significant. This is probably because urbanization offers greater opportunities for the best use of capital on a large scale than in agrarian societies. This difference in the ability to form capital accelerates income dispersion since urbanization is closely related to industrialization which requires a large capital investment and the amount of available capital is usually small. Thus the marginal productivity of capital is much higher than that of labor.

The effects of political participation on the different-share-of income groups are clearcut. They are strongly progress toward equality. The variation in the effects of political participation however is worth noticing. The independent political participation effect on the upper

income groups is high and negative, whereas its effect is moderately positive on the middle income groups. On the other hand, its effect on the lowest income groups is positive and large, implying that political participation is an important resource for lower class to improve their income share. The t-statistics suggest that the relationships are statistically significant at 0.05 level.

The capitalist system tends to increase the share of the upper and upper middle income groups whereas it lessens that of the lower income groups. On average the shares of income of the fourth and the lowest 20 percent income groups are 44 percent and 81 percent lower than those of the same percent income groups in the communist countries. The data show that the share of the lower income groups is relatively higher in the underdeveloped economies than that in more developed countries. The direction of the effects of the competitiveness and regularity in the elections are not clear and their relations to income distribution are not statistically significant.

In sum, the upper most income group favors economic development without socio-political mobilization. This group is particularly vulnerable to political participation and the expansion of masscommunication. On the other hand, capitalist growth is violent against the lowest income group. Political participation is a only effective resource to increase their relative income share. We should note however that the argument made here assumes that absolute income gain and the norm of freedom are held constant. We simply predict the preference of different income groups from the standpoint of their income share.

Conclusion

The present study ascertains the effect of the overall process of socioeconomic mobilization on income distribution, and role played by political participation in that process. We asked; to what extent do economic development, the corresponding social changes and political mobilization, independently and jointly, influence income distribution.

The analysis showed that economic development per se did not narrow income inequality. What is important was the nature of social and political changes accompanying economic development. Among different social changes, the expansion of masscommunication measured by the volume of newspaper circulation was the most important income equalizer in the process of socioeconomic mobilization.

The main question we asked in this study was whether political participation was positively related to economic equality. The answer was positive. The independent effect of political participation measured by voters turnout on income equality was largely positive and the relationship was statistically significant. However, since socioeconomic mobilization does not automatically expand political participation, the effect of economic development through it was minor. Relatively large impact of masscommunication and political participation implies that in countries where economic development and accompanying socio-political mobilization is great, a significant income equalization is expected to follow economic development.

The current study offers an important implication for the strategy for equitable growth. The emphasis of the development strategists has been to simply to increase gross national product. Economic development has

been thought to be good medicine for poverty. Therefore, to hasten economic development, a large amount of foreign capital was invested privately or through international organizations. Gross national product has grown considerably but the relative share of the lower income group has not increased. The analysis here showed that important factor in achieving equitable growth was a social and political mobilization to go along with economic development, not economic development per se. Development strategists, intentionally or unintentionally, have neglected these variables in planning for economic development. Rather, to achieve rapid growth, they have tended to limit the expansion of masscommunication and political participation to maximize governability.

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