システム情報系 社会工学域
2019年度 ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)
日時:2019年 4月 18日(木)16:30-18:00
場所:3F1200L (3F棟12階)
講演者:Yuval Heller 氏(Bar Ilan University )
司会者:澤亮治
Title: Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values (Joint with
Christoph Kuzmics)
Abstract:
We study coordination games with pre-play communication in which agents
have private preferences over the feasible coordinated outcomes. We
present a novel intuitive equilibrium strategy with the following
properties: (1) each agent reports his preferred outcome (and nothing
else), (2) agents never miscoordinate, (3) if the agents have the same
preferred outcome, then they coordinate on this outcome, and (4)
otherwise, there is a “fallback norm” that determines the coordinated
outcome. We show that this behavior is essentially the unique
renegotiation-proof strategy, and that it satisfies appealing
properties: independence of the distribution of private preferences,
Pareto optimality, high ex-ante expected payoff, and evolutionary
stability.
The presenter's website:
https://sites.google.com/site/