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Hakimov
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WZB Berlin Social Science Center,
Research Fellowj
@่@@@F@Contests at the workplace: with and without prize
selection, testing
theory in a field experiment.
abstract
We conduct a
field experiment with workers of the microcredit company in Russia to study the
effects of the different designs of a contest for monetary prizes at the
workplace. We consider a standard all-pay auction design with two and four
prizes of different size and compare it to gparallelh contests with the same
prizes, but where participants have to choose the prize prior to the start of
the competition and then the winner is selected only among the players who chose
the same prize. Despite the theoretical predictions, the parallel contests lead
to higher efforts for all players, but mainly by lower-ability players. Division
of prizes leads to the predicted effects. In parallel contests, too many players
choose the higher prize than equilibrium suggests. Overall, the parallel version
of contests appeared to be more profitable for the firm.