システム情報系　社会工学域

 　　平成２９年度　　　　ファカルティ・セミナー

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（Faculty Seminar）

 日　時　　　：　平成２９年６月１日（木）１６：３０〜１８：００

場　所　　　：　F1200-L

講　演　者　：　笠松　怜史　氏（東京大学大学院経済学研究科）

                 　　　 岸下　大樹　氏（東京大学大学院経済学研究科）

司会者　　　：　栗野　盛光

演　題　　　：　Informative Campaign: Multidimensionality and Irrational Voters

 　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＜ abstract ＞

We construct a model in which an incumbent and a challenger decide how to allocate campaign resources to two types of campaign (policy and ability) in an election. We show that its allocation conveys truthful information only when rational voters and irrational voters coexist. In addition, we show that in any separating equilibria, negative campaign against the incumbent’s ability occurs as a signal of the incumbent’s low ability. Overall, these results imply that (i) a candidate’s campaign allocation over issues (i.e., campaign message) sends a signal to voters, and (ii) the relationship between the existence of a separating equilibrium and the number of irrational voters is non-monotonic.