システム情報系 社会工学域
平成28年度 ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)
日 時 : 平成28年12月16日(金)
16:30〜18:00
場 所 : F1200-L
講 演 者 : 我妻 靖 氏(早稲田大学政治経済学部)
司会者 : 栗野 盛光
演 題 : Testable
imiplications of no envy allocations
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abstract
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We investigate testable implications of no envy allocations
via revealed preference approach. For an observed data which consists of
finitely many allocations for a given group of agents, we seek what conditions
must be satisfied by the data in order to rationalize that the data is
consistent with envy free allocations. To achieve our goal, we follow the method
used in Brown and Matzkin (1996) and Snyder (1999, 2000) which consists of two
steps. First, we show that a system of inequalities whose solvability is
equivalent to rationalization. Then, we apply Tarski-Seidenburg theorem to the
system of inequalities to obtain quantifier-free conditions for rationalization
for the case when allocation data consists only two allocations. We also deal
with testable implications of no envy and efficient allocations, and we show
that efficiency puts no further observable restriction to no envyness when the
number of agents and observations are two. Trough numerical example, we
demonstrate these conditions are not vacuous.