システム情報系 社会工学域

 

 

  平成28年度    ファカルティ・セミナー

               Faculty Seminar

 

 

日 時   : 平成28年12月16日(金)      16:30〜18:00

場 所   : F1200-L

講 演 者 : 我妻 靖 氏(早稲田大学政治経済学部)

司会者   : 栗野 盛光

演 題   : Testable imiplications of no envy allocations

 

 

 

 

 

                  < abstract

We investigate testable implications of no envy allocations via revealed preference approach. For an observed data which consists of finitely many allocations for a given group of agents, we seek what conditions must be satisfied by the data in order to rationalize that the data is consistent with envy free allocations. To achieve our goal, we follow the method used in Brown and Matzkin (1996) and Snyder (1999, 2000) which consists of two steps. First, we show that a system of inequalities whose solvability is equivalent to rationalization. Then, we apply Tarski-Seidenburg theorem to the system of inequalities to obtain quantifier-free conditions for rationalization for the case when allocation data consists only two allocations. We also deal with testable implications of no envy and efficient allocations, and we show that efficiency puts no further observable restriction to no envyness when the number of agents and observations are two. Trough numerical example, we demonstrate these conditions are not vacuous.