日 時 : 平成28年9月9日(金) 16:30〜18:00
場 所 : F1200−L
講 演 者 : 佐野 隆司 先生(京都大学経済研究所)
司会者 : 栗野 盛光 先生
演 題 : A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Multi-period Demands and Long-term
Contracts
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abstract
>
This paper considers a
dynamic mechanism design problem in which one
unit of an object or a service
slot is allocated in each period. Agents have a two-dimensional
type about
their demand slots and valuations: i.e., some agents
demand only one slot and
others demand multiple slots. We characterize necessary
and sufficient
condition for incentive compatibility and provide the optimal
mechanism that
maximizes the seller’s
expected revenue. We also consider that
agents with multi-slot demand may
behave as multiple agents with unit demand.
The
“multi-contracting-proofness” can be a constraint on the seller's
revenue.