日 時    : 平成28年9月9日(金)   16:30〜18:00
場 所    : F1200−L
講 演 者  : 佐野 隆司 先生(京都大学経済研究所)
司会者    : 栗野 盛光 先生
演 題    : A Dynamic Mechanism Design with Multi-period Demands and Long-term Contracts

 

                  < abstract

This paper considers a dynamic mechanism design problem in which one
unit of an object or a service slot is allocated in each period. Agents have a two-dimensional
type about their demand slots and valuations: i.e., some agents
demand only one slot and others demand multiple slots. We characterize necessary
and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility and provide the optimal
mechanism that maximizes the seller
s expected revenue. We also consider that
agents with multi-slot demand may behave as multiple agents with unit demand.
The
multi-contracting-proofness can be a constraint on the seller's revenue.