日　時　　　　：　平成２８年７月２１日（木）      １６：３０〜１８：００

場　所　　　　：　F1200-R

講　演　者　　：　鈴木　亨　氏（シドニー工科大ビジネススクール経済学科）

司会者　　　　：　栗野　盛光

演　題　　　　：　Task autonomy and incentive

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　＜ abstract ＞

Task autonomy is known to be an important factor that could determine the motivation of workers, yet it has been paid little attention in the standard principal-agent models. This paper analyzes the role of task autonomy in an informed principal model with moral hazard. It is shown that whenever an equilibrium contract reflects the principal's private information, task autonomy is a positive incentive device, confirming the view of psychologists and practitioners. It is also found that the principal's signaling motive distorts the ex ante optimal allocation of task autonomy, suggesting the possible benefit of a rule-based autonomy.