平成27年度 ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)
日 時 : 2016年2月12日(金) 16:30−18:00
場 所 : 3F1222
講演者 : 千葉 早織
京都大学 経済研究科
司会者 : 栗野 盛光
演 題 : Hidden Profiles and Persuasion Cascades
in Group Decision Making
< 概要 >
This paper provides a model of
persuasion cascades in group decision making. This explains hidden profiles
players do not share their private information with the others, and the group
fails. In this model, a group of rational players with common interest will
jointly select a decision through voting. One decision (a correct decision)
benefits all players while the other decision (a wrong decision) hurts all of
them. Attributes decide which decision is correct, but each player privately and
imperfectly knows those attributes. Hence, before voting, the players meet and
sequentially talk. Suppose that some player benevolently talks about his
information which is against the correct decision. Because of this talk, the
next player expects that the wrong decision is more likely to be correct than
the correct decision while his unique information is against this expectation.
Then, the next player repeats the previous talk because he does not want to
confuse the other players with his unique information. In this way, the rational
players persuade one another by withholding private information and repeating
commonly shared information. As a result, the group is misguided to select a
wrong decision.