平成27年度  ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)


日 時 : 2016年2月12日(金)  16:30−18:00
場 所 : 3F1222
講演者 : 千葉 早織
      京都大学 経済研究科
司会者 : 栗野 盛光
演 題 : Hidden Profiles and Persuasion Cascades in Group Decision Making
 

< 概要 >
This paper provides a model of persuasion cascades in group decision making. This explains hidden profiles players do not share their private information with the others, and the group fails. In this model, a group of rational players with common interest will jointly select a decision through voting. One decision (a correct decision) benefits all players while the other decision (a wrong decision) hurts all of them. Attributes decide which decision is correct, but each player privately and imperfectly knows those attributes. Hence, before voting, the players meet and sequentially talk. Suppose that some player benevolently talks about his information which is against the correct decision. Because of this talk, the next player expects that the wrong decision is more likely to be correct than the correct decision while his unique information is against this expectation. Then, the next player repeats the previous talk because he does not want to confuse the other players with his unique information. In this way, the rational players persuade one another by withholding private information and repeating commonly shared information. As a result, the group is misguided to select a wrong decision.