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                       (Faculty Seminar)

 

 

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[Université de la Méditeranée and GREQAM]

Ži‰ïŽÒ@F@Îì@—³ˆê˜Y

‰‰@‘è@F@Aggregate consequences of interactions among boundedly rational@@
heterogeneous agents

 

 

                           ƒ ŠT—v

 

In this lecture, we consider models and experimental results of interactions among boundedly rational heterogeneous agents. A particular emphasis will be placed on understanding the kind of strategic environments that result in such interaction to generate outcomes that deviate quite largely from the equilibrium prediction under homogeneous rational agents.