システム情報系 社会工学域                            

 

 

         平成24年度  ファカルティ・セミナー

                       (Faculty Seminar)

 

 

日 時 : 2012710()  10:0011:05

場 所 : 第三学群F棟 3F1102

講演者 : 崔 誠賢 [ 筑波大学大学院システム情報工学研究科 ]

司会者 : 石川 竜一郎

演 題 : The structure of the competitive equilibria in an assignment market

 

 

 

 

                           abstract

 

We consider the structure of the set of competitive equilibria in a generalized assignment market. In an assignment market with homogeneous indivisible goods, we can observe the result of non-simultaneous multiplicity that if there are multiple competitive prices, the equilibrium quantity is unique; equivalently, if there are multiple equilibrium quantities, the competitive price is unique. We show that
non-simultaneous multiplicity holds separately for each type of indivisible good in a market with heterogeneous indivisible goods. Based on this result, for each good, we evaluate the sizes of the sets of competitive prices and quantities. These results are proved only under the basic assumptions on the generalized assignment market. As an application, we give a sufficient condition for large assignment markets so that the set of competitive prices shrinks to a unique price when the markets get larger and denser.