システム情報系 社会工学域
平成24年度 ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)
日 時 : 2012年7月10日(火) 10:00−11:05
場 所 : 第三学群F棟 3F1102
講演者 : 崔 誠賢 [
筑波大学大学院システム情報工学研究科
]
司会者 : 石川 竜一郎
演 題 : The
structure of the competitive equilibria in an assignment market
<
abstract
>
We consider the structure of the set of
competitive equilibria in a generalized assignment market. In an assignment
market with homogeneous indivisible goods, we can observe the result of
non-simultaneous multiplicity that if there are multiple competitive prices, the
equilibrium quantity is unique; equivalently, if there are multiple equilibrium
quantities, the competitive price is unique. We show that
non-simultaneous
multiplicity holds separately for each type of indivisible good in a market with
heterogeneous indivisible goods. Based on this result, for each good, we
evaluate the sizes of the sets of competitive prices and quantities. These
results are proved only under the basic assumptions on the generalized
assignment market. As an application, we give a sufficient condition for large
assignment markets so that the set of competitive prices shrinks to a unique
price when the markets get larger and denser.