システム情報系　社会工学域　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　    

         平成24年度　　ファカルティ・セミナー

                       (Faculty Seminar)

日　時　：　2012年7月9日(月)　　14:00−15:05

場　所　：　第三学群F棟　3F1102

講演者　：　成田　悠輔　[ 米国MIT 経済学研究科 ]

司会者　：　石川　竜一郎

演　題　：　Promoting School Competition Through School Choice :

A Market Design Approach

                           ＜ abstract ＞

In this talk, we study the effect of different school choice　mechanisms on schools’ incentives for quality improvement. To do so, we introduce the following criterion: A mechanism respects improvements of school quality if each school becomes weakly better off whenever that school improves and thereby becomes more preferred by students. We first show that no stable mechanism, or mechanism that is Pareto efficient for students (such as the Boston and top trading cycles mechanisms), respects improvements of school quality. Nevertheless, for large school districts, we demonstrate that any stable mechanism approximately respects improvements of school quality; by contrast, the Boston and top trading cycles mechanisms fail to do so. Thus a stable mechanism may provide better incentives for schools to improve themselves than the Boston and top trading cycles mechanisms. Given these theoretical results, we also discuss how to connect them to data generated in real-life school choice systems.