日 時 ： 2012年2 月16日(木) 16:30−18:00
場 所 ： 第三学群F棟 3F 1115
講演者 ： Tai-Wei Hu [ Northwestern University and Penn State University ]
司会者 ： 金子 守
演 題 ： Information aggregation and ex post optimality in a large, two-stage, Cournot market
＜ abstract ＞
We study a model of strategic trade using a mechanism that resembles a market. There are two main approaches to doing that. One uses a double-auction type of mechanism; the other, which is used here, uses a Cournot quantity type of mechanism. Our mechanism has two stages and is inspired by parimutuel betting. The second stage resembles the determination of final odds and payoffs in parimutuel betting. The first stage is a version of the announced running bet totals and odds in parimutuel betting. In a version that is essentially a divisible-goods version of the private/common values model of Reny-Perry (2006), we show existence of an equilibrium that is almost ex post efficient when the number of players is finite, but large.