システム情報工学研究科
平成２3年度 ファカルティ・セミナー
(Faculty Seminar)
場 所 ： 第三学群F棟 ３F
1136
講演者 ： Dimitry
Rtischev [ 学習院大学経済学部
]
司会者 ： 石川 竜一郎
演 題 ： Evolution of
rationality in a population of agents playing
a public goods
game
＜
abstract
＞
If we were to
discover an isolated population of agents who, for many generations, have been
playing a public goods game and have been subject to evolutionary selection
based on individual earnings in the game, what kind of play based on what kind
of rationality would we find in this population? To explore this question,
we model the evolution of agents randomly paired to play a sequential public
goods game. We emphasize how theory of mind capabilities enable agents to
develop a subjective rationality that partially overcomes the social dilemma
within each dyad. We find it plausible that the population would evolve to
practice such subjective rationality and thereby achieve levels of public good
production significantly above Nash equilibrium, but not as high as under full
cooperation.
Keywords: evolution of preferences, theory of mind,
rationality, cooperation, evolutionary game theory