システム情報工学研究科　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　    

         平成1６年度　　ファカルティ・セミナー

                       (Faculty Seminar)

日　時　：　2004年12月16日(木)　　16:30-18:00

場　所　：　第三学群F棟　３F 1136

講演者　：　河村　耕平　　 [ オックスフォード大学 経済学博士課程 ]

司会者　：　江口　匡太

演　題　：　Anonymous Cheap Talk

                           ＜ abstract ＞

This paper studies the role of anonymity in communication, by extending the standard cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) to a multi-sender setting where the uninformed party (receiver) cannot identify the sender of a message. We find strikingly different messaging strategies of the senders from those found in the standard non-anonymous (one-to-one) information transmission game. In particular, under anonymity senders do not reveal truthfully even if there is no individual conflict of interest, but some information can still be transmitted even when the conflict is so large that messages are completely uninformative in non-anonymous communication. We conclude that anonymous communication is likely to be adopted when the level of conflict is high. Also, we show that anonymity extends the possibility of communication especially when the number of senders is large.