Seminar Abstract

【Credible Coalition Structures with Externalities】

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Speaker: 船木 由喜彦

Affiliation: 早稲田大学 政治経済学部

Date and Time: 2002. (Thu), 4:30 - 6:00 p.m.

Place: 3F1136

Chair: 秋山 英三

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Abstract: 

In this paper, we examine the questions of which coalition
structure is formed and how payoff is distributed in cooperative
games with externalities. We introduce a concept of a credible
coalition structure by capturing explicitly the credibility of
blocking coalitions, and then propose a recursive definition of the core
of a game with externalities, called the credible core.
As applications, we study common pool resource games and
linear public good games. We find that there is an
efficient or quasi-efficient allocation under a credible
coalition structure in these games.